Writing as Refiguration: Lucy Grealy’s Autobiography of a Face by Mintz, Susannah B.
Skidmore College
Creative Matter
English Faculty Scholarship English
2001
Writing as Refiguration: Lucy Grealy’s
Autobiography of a Face
Susannah B. Mintz
Skidmore College, smintz@skidmore.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/eng_fac_schol
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for inclusion in English Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more information, please contact jluo@skidmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mintz, Susannah B. "Writing as Refiguration: Lucy Grealy's Autobiography of a Face." Biography 24.1 (2001): 172-184.
 writing as refiguration:
 lucy grealy's autobiography of a face
 SUSANNAH B. MINTZ
 The disabled woman who writes the story of her body transgresses a partic
 ularly charged ideological boundary. Her rootedness in textual flesh, her
 stubborn insistence on telling the tale of a broken body, defy the disembod
 ied consciousness, the triumphant will and mind that are the legacy of Carte
 sian dualism as well as the originary point of much life writing by men.1 At
 the same time, she may also seem to reproduce a problematically essential
 ized view of female identity as meaningful only through the body. How does
 such an author take advantage of post-structuralist indeterminacy, the verbal
 play that locates identity and autobiography alike in a slippage of possibili
 ties, without also relinquishing the corporeal specificity by which she
 demands recognition of her experience? How does the idea of creating a self
 through writing reconcile itself to the way in which illness returns one so res
 olutely to the forces of anatomy?
 This essay will address such questions through discussion of Autobiogra
 phy of a Face, Lucy Grealy's account of a nearly twenty-year attempt to sur
 gically restore a jaw lost to cancer. In this narrative of disfiguring disease,
 Grealy does more than rewrite the "script" of female or disabled identity, as
 if the body were simply inert, "raw material" written on by cultural assump
 tions. While she does foreground the idea that selfhood is in part narrated
 by such forms of storytelling as movies, television shows, and medical dis
 course, she also insists that the body exerts its own force, emphasizing the
 combination of language and body in the formation of self. Indeed, Grealy
 suggests that thinking in terms of "twoness" at all—of "body" and "mind"
 as discrete, if connected, entities—falsely separates what are interpenetrating
 and mutually constitutive aspects of self. Instead, she demonstrates that her
 sense of self is inseparable from the condition of her face, even if, or espe
 cially because, that face is also subject to patriarchal attitudes toward female
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 beauty and sexuality. Grealy writes not as a passive body onto which other
 ness, in the form of gender or deformity, has simply been pasted, but rather
 as a uniquely lived body enmeshed in social practice, family circumstance,
 and private desire.
 To the degree that we cannot detach her narrative from her disease,
 Grealy suggests that there is also no way to disentangle the physical from the
 psychical—from that thinking mind or writerly consciousness we discover in
 Autobiography of a Face. She is her body, so far as we come to know her
 through her text. Or as she declares, "my face, my 'self'" (170). At one level,
 Grealy risks enforcing the idea that women are bound to the flesh, or that the
 "true" nature of the disabled is condensed in their afflicted body parts. In a
 similar way, the fact that she records the process of accepting herself after
 painful encounters with prejudice may seem to heroize the experience of dis
 ease. Yet I would argue that by openly displaying her "freakishness" on the
 one hand, and by ultimately coming to terms with a face that does not abide
 by societal norms on the other, Grealy enlists corporeal difference to force a
 confrontation with cultural mythology—exposing the deleterious effects not
 of disease, but rather of normative attitudes about the body and identity that
 signify that illness in a particular way. Far from solipsistically "confessing"
 her physical pain and hurt pride, or sentimentalizing her triumph over adver
 sity,2 Grealy provokes us to reconsider the notion of the disabled figure as a
 "normal" body gone wrong, an inversion or perversion of the ideal. The social
 construction of the female body as inferior, a deviation from the male, places
 the disabled woman at a difficult cultural intersection, where she confronts
 not only patriarchal oppression against her gender, but also the oppressions
 of an able-bodied culture that "glorifies fitness and physical conformity"
 (Hillyer 3). As many critics have noted, the tradition in western ideology of
 figuring women in terms of simultaneous monstrosity and lack makes "dis
 abled woman" a conceptual redundancy.3 Thus by reconceiving "disability"
 as a function not of biology but rather of power and discourse, Grealy denat
 uralizes its apparent truth-status as an indicator of "real" corporeal flaws. The
 claim she makes for bodily particularity contests an ideology-of-the-same that
 would relegate her to the outskirts of cultural acceptance.
 First diagnosed with Ewing's sarcoma at the age of ten, Grealy under
 went extensive surgery that removed part of her jaw. Over thirty reconstruc
 tive procedures followed, a series of largely ineffective surgeries that attest to
 her own, as well as her parents' and her physicians', literally invasive need to
 normalize her even after the malignancy had been fully removed. Long after
 her condition ceases to be life-threatening in what we might pretend is a
 strictly "physical" sense, Grealy's disfigured jaw lives on as a badge of sick
 ness, a frightening indication of the body's mysterious interiority, a sign of
 the mind's failure to remain in control. While Grealy may be said to return
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 to a state of health, the condition of her face continues to signify that some
 thing is "wrong" with her, to mark her as abnormal. In a culture that "tells
 us again and again that we can most be ourselves by acting and looking like
 someone else" (222), Grealy's face denies her the sense of legitimate indi
 viduality that is guaranteed by identification with the dominant culture's
 codes of female beauty, and she internalizes the message that physical differ
 ence is the outward manifestation of an "ugliness" of character or self. Unable
 to subdue her unruly body or to suppress the signs of her difference, she
 describes floundering attempts to adhere to the only available, and ultimate
 ly deeply alienating, social narratives of female identity.
 In a discussion of her teenage job working pony parties, for example,
 Grealy locates an early awareness of who she is "supposed" to be in the
 responses of others—especially the "open, uncensored stares" of children
 (7)—to the "strange triangular shape" of her face (3). In the exclusive neigh
 borhoods of suburban New York, where "house after house looked exactly
 like the one next to it" (2), inclusion is guaranteed by "carbon-copy" same
 ness, so that Grealy's appearance marks her not simply as one other body
 among many, but as extraordinary—at once insufficient and excessive in her
 divergence from a physical norm. In the specific social context of "those back
 yards" (7), Grealy learns to occupy multiple positions of otherness. She is the
 working-class outsider, the Irish immigrant whose homelife lacks the coher
 ence of an idealized nuclear family. But it is her face—"pale and misshapen"
 (6), "an uneasy reminder of what might be" (11)—that serves as the most
 salient ground of her difference. "I was my face," she writes, "I was ugliness.
 . . . Everything led to it, everything receded from it" (7). Utilizing not the
 adjective but the noun, Grealy represents herself as embodying the very con
 dition of ugliness. Ugliness is not just one attribute of a whole person; rather,
 she is ugliness itself. In the unabashed stares of children, the averted eyes of
 adults, Grealy reads her own form as "dangerous" (11), grotesque, unworthy
 of love. The social stigma against corporeal difference, ultimately derived
 from arbitrary categories of meaning, subsumes her identity in the visible
 sign of her disease.
 Autobiography of a Face thus represents illness as more than a function of
 brute physiological process or even the very real battle of being "authenti
 cally sick" (20). The text begins not with a transparent account of Grealy's
 physical condition, but rather with a description of the complex web of power
 relations that makes that condition legible. Her "physical oddness" as a "dis
 figured child" (4) induces feelings of guilt and embarrassment not because
 her face is somehow essentially shameful, but rather because it can be discur
 sively construed as less desirable than other, "perfectly formed" children (10).
 In the protracted struggle to coordinate her face with a developing subjectiv
 ity, Grealy repudiates the structural reality of her face as having anything to
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 do with her "true" self, dissociating the effects of surgery from her sense of
 who she "is." "Maybe this wasn't my actual face at all," she writes, "but the
 face of some interloper, some ugly intruder. ... I began to imagine my 'orig
 inal' face, the one free from all deviation, all error" (157). Her language
 makes explicit the cultural demonization of atypical bodily forms. Grealy her
 self perceives her own "misshapen" face as evidence of her incapacity to con
 form, a kind of moralized straying off course that signals a failure of self-mas
 tery. In response, she compartmentalizes her sense of self, trying to contain
 "ugliness" in her chin and jaw; but when she attempts to integrate the two
 sections of her face, "the lower half canceled out the beauty of the upper
 half," defeating any sense of identity apart from the belief that her face is a
 monstrous anomaly (157). As Rosemarie Garland Thomson states, within
 the "totalizing" narratives of cultural expectation, "the deviant characteristic
 overwhelms all of a person's other, unmarked aspects" (Extraordinary 34).
 Persuaded that her "missing jaw" represents ontological lack, Grealy feels
 "completely alone and without any chance of ever being loved" (154, 155).
 In Extraordinary Bodies, her study of literary and cultural representations
 of disability in America, Thomson contends that "disability" is "an overarch
 ing and in some ways artificial category" that encompasses many more forms
 of embodied difference than simply the "prototypical disabled person" who
 "never leaves a wheelchair, is totally blind, or profoundly deaf' (13). By using
 the term to refer to a shifting range of traits—including progressive disease,
 acute illness, temporary injury, birthmarks, obesity, amputations, and the
 effects of so-called "normal" aging—Thomas emphasizes the point that dis
 ablement and dysfunction cannot be neatly confined to a subset of bodies
 marked by obvious loss or impairment. Disability might be said to apply to
 any physical type other than the white, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied
 norm of western culture. A "facial disfigurement" like Grealy's, Thomson
 would argue, is psychologically and socially disabling, though not accompa
 nied by "physical dysfunction" (14). As Grealy makes clear, her appearance
 perpetuates a kind of unhealthiness even after she no longer has cancer.
 Undergoing her last round of operations to "correct" the mistake of her face,
 she reveals how embedded corporeal difference is in social relations: "Since
 physically I was capable of taking care of myself, and medically there was no
 need for me to be an inpatient, it did not escape my attention that I was
 being treated like a sick person simply because I did not look like other peo
 ple" (216). The perceived abnormality of Grealy's facial shape—what Thom
 son calls a "formal," rather than a "functional" disability (14)—defines her
 whole self. She is seen (and sees herself) as weak, and in need of tending, pity,
 or compensation.
 Indeed, it is as if cancer is replaced by a form of "illness" that Patricia
 Hampl has named "the beauty disease": "the stark neediness and extravagance
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 of wanting to be beautiful" (127) in a culture in which "simply . . . [having]
 a physical existence" causes many women to see themselves as "freak[s]"
 (106), their bodies a fleshly encumbrance they "dra[g] repulsively through
 the world" (133). If such self-punition is common among women whose
 bodies are deemed "normal" by cultural standards, it is particularly pointed
 for those whose bodies defy the normative female form. Encouraged to
 measure their worth through their physical shape, but inculcated as well in
 western culture's doctrine of psyche over physicality, many women have
 recorded responding to the depredations of disease with a sense of shame and
 moral inadequacy. Audre Lorde, for example, writes in her journal A Burst
 of Light that she "felt like a total failure" on being diagnosed with liver can
 cer. The fact that six years spent "living and loving and working to my
 utmost potential" could not prevent a recurrence of cancer signals the insuf
 ficiency of these specifically mental efforts (290-91), and when Lorde com
 plains that the medical community infantilizes her, refusing to recognize
 "my responsibility for my own body" (289), she herself implicitly parental
 izes her decision-making mind as the protector and caretaker of her physical
 form. And Nancy Mairs, whose accounts of coping with degenerative mul
 tiple sclerosis emphatically deny the mind/body binary, nonetheless refers to
 "all these years trying alternately to repudiate and to control my wayward
 body, to transcend it one way or another" (Remembering 234); "Because I
 hate being crippled," she writes, "I sometimes hate myself for being crippled.
 Over the years I have come to expect—even accept—attacks of violent self
 loathing" (Plaintext 16). Discussing such slippage from embodiment to inte
 riorized self-deprecation, Thomson writes that "[c]orporeal departures from
 dominant expectations never go uninterpreted or unpunished" (Extraordi
 nary7). For Grealy, the loss of "self-esteem" associated with physical abnor
 mality is inflected in a particular way by the fact that her difference is con
 tained in her face (200)—that part of the body that most resolutely signifies
 individual identity, and that most immediately determines whether a woman
 meets cultural standards of beauty. (So deeply connected is the face with
 both beauty and identity, in fact, that it is often not even thought of as a part
 of "the body."4) Hearing a woman describe her "feelings of ugliness" after a
 mastectomy, Grealy declares that "[h]er problems lay in her perception. Talk
 ing with her only strengthened my conviction of the importance in this world
 of having a beautiful face" (168). Each new reconstructive surgery is an
 attempt to "fix my face, fix my life, my soul" (215), underscoring the way in
 which a body read as broken becomes a measure of both social value and
 strength of character or spiritual worth.
 Some eighteen years after her first series of operations, Grealy writes
 that she still "couldn't make what I saw in the mirror correspond to the per
 son I thought I was" (219). Her face is an "obstacle" that she can only
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 "compensate for, but never overcome" (206); radically disjunct in her imag
 ination, "self" and "body" regard each other across a seemingly irreparable
 ideological chasm. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely her illness that
 grants her some sense, if provisional, of selfhood. Calling herself an "alien"
 adrift in a welter of conflicting pressures (7), she ventriloquizes a sequence of
 roles aimed at diminishing, even while they depend upon, the singularity of
 her face. In the early pages of her memoir, Grealy describes her childhood
 self as "desperate for any kind of definition" (11), a performer "dependent"
 upon the response of her audience, even a disapproving one, to feel ground
 ed in stable subjectivity (4). The disfigurement of her face, freighted as it is
 with cultural significance, provides her with what she calls "macabre status"
 (11), and she transforms her life as a hospitalized patient into a television
 "drama" in which she is "the principal player" (20). Wanting "nothing more
 than to be special," she takes on the role of "good" patient (21), one who
 bravely endures chemotherapy without crying, to please her emotionally dis
 tant mother, and to detach herself from the real physical anguish of the treat
 ments. Later, as a college student, she will camouflage her inability to achieve
 culturally approved standards of beauty by affecting the stance of androgy
 nous poet. Later still, she will act out a kind of hyper-femininity, brandish
 ing her sexuality in spiked heels and mini-skirts.
 This repeated display of what Grealy refers to as her "various personae"
 (38)—or to put it another way, Grealy's narrative emphasis on these semiotic
 performances—demonstrates the power of cultural stereotypes to enforce
 conformity. Yet even as Grealy strives to fulfill her fantasies of goodness or
 prettiness—revealing a more urgent need to be recognized in the psycholog
 ical sense as a separate self and a legitimate "author" of desire5—she must also
 acknowledge her body's intractable refusal to meet societal expectations. Far
 from suggesting that identity is merely a superficial pageant of ideological
 tableaux, Grealy's life story coalesces around the persistent presence of her
 face. If the juxtaposition of various roles undermines our hold on any single,
 essential "Lucy," her ever-changing face becomes an unexpectedly stable
 point of reference. It is inescapable as a physical, emotional, social signifier.
 Grealy's disfigurement is thus both metaphorical and profoundly real:6 no
 number of operations suffices to assimilate her face into a universal model of
 normalcy, and in this it serves to underscore the endless particularity of all
 bodily types. The futility of Grealy's contorting her "self" in accordance with
 cultural demands pertains to all embodied people; we cannot act or write
 ourselves out of our bodies.
 New stories of physical experience, however—ones that resist stereotypes
 of disabled identity and female beauty—can be written. G. Thomas Couser
 has demonstrated that disability narratives by men often seek to transcend
 the afflicted body, to reassert the primacy of consciousness, attempting to
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 recuperate bodily brokenness through claims of a whole, unified, transcen
 dent mind. If ignoring or subordinating the body is a potentially bankrupt
 move for women autobiographers in general, it would be particularly delim
 iting for the disabled woman, merely reifying the cultural invisibility and
 unworthiness of her body through narrative suppression. But Grealy manip
 ulates the traditional conventions of self-writing to reinterpret the binary of
 body and culture, in part by foregrounding the transformative properties of
 language, and in part through a dual emphasis on identity as simultaneous
 ly "scripted" and physical. The very title of Grealy's memoir speaks to the
 fact that bodies are stories (they are constituted in language) and have stories
 to tell (they have a reality or "perspective" of their own). By repeatedly jux
 taposing depictions of self-as-performative and self-as-corporeal, Grealy sug
 gests that neither alone is a hilly adequate point of origin for subjectivity,
 and that writing the self means writing as an embodied woman.
 In a remarkable instance of the power of words to create reality, Grealy
 recounts her realization, after several years of living with disease, that what
 she suffered from was in fact cancer:
 In all that time, not one person ever said the word cancer to me, at least not in a
 way that registered as pertaining to me. . . . Language supplies us with ways to
 express ever subtler levels of meaning, but does that imply language gives mean
 ing, or robs us of it when we are at a loss to name things? (43—44)
 As Grealy goes on to point out, words have histories; to know that she had
 "cancer" would be to live in and through some entirely different reality of ill
 ness than the one "malignancy" and "Ewing's sarcoma" had already created.
 But as the autobiography itself confirms, this revelatory moment does not
 inevitably trap Grealy in a prison house of language. Her successive per
 formances of culturally authorized identities anticipate a later understanding
 that she can redefine herself from within the frame of her face. So too does
 this scene of newly appreciating the density of words lead her gradually to
 comprehend that because the violence of cultural bias is deployed through
 language, it can be rewritten. The child who can "save herself by pretending"
 (115), who so desperately longs for "praise and appreciation" that even being
 censured as a "freak" feels confirming (123, 155), learns that the very over
 lap of physical difference and verbal narrative by which she feels herself
 barred From authentic participation in her relationships can make her "the
 creator of my own situation" (101).
 Grealy also represents illness as a process of coming to awareness of her
 physical self, of recognizing the interdependence of its various parts. Describ
 ing waking up from her fourth operation—the one that removed the tumor
 from her jaw—and limping across her hospital room, Grealy writes that "the
 body is a connected thing" (56), no one part of it fully discrete or able to be
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 isolated from the whole. There is something irreducible, Grealy implies,
 about physical experience, "a meaning that [does] not extend beyond the
 confines of one's body" (149). In this sense, the state of being "diseased" both
 eludes linguistic representation, and is endlessly available to the narrative
 constructions of social prejudice. Grealy thus follows contemporary disabil
 ity and feminist theorists in challenging the foundational move of social con
 struction—the subsuming of body into culture—which Elizabeth Grosz cri
 tiques as the patriarchal, or "logocentric, gesture par excellence" (21). Grosz
 encourages replacing the essentialism of binary opposition not with social
 construction (itself dependent on the notion of an asocial, "pliable" body)
 but by a more subtle, constitutive interaction of body and mind, what she
 calls "embodied subjectivity" and "psychical corporeality" (22). Such a model
 would collapse the boundary that demarcates the normal from the anomalous
 as a discursive fiction, without losing the political and psychological signifi
 cance of bodily specificity. In turn, a theory of autobiography as actively
 creating the subject within its narrative must also acknowledge the fact that
 the narrative is not only written by a body, but simultaneously creates a new
 version of the body writing. "Self" or "life" writing might thus more prop
 erly be called "auto/body/ography."
 The disabled body reminds us that bodies in general cannot be univer
 salized. By exposing the boundaries of culture's idealized physical form as
 historically specific and ideologically produced, discussions of corporeal dif
 ference broaden our collective awareness of what it means to say that sub
 jectivity is always already embodied. Grealy reinforces the idea that her dis
 ease affords her a vantage point to which she would not otherwise have had
 access, mapping out a trajectory from renunciation to reconciliation. Auto
 biography of a Face sustains an important tension between the insights gar
 nered through illness and Grealy's urgent desire to eschew the face she has
 for the fantasy face of idealized beauty. Obsessed with ugliness, convinced
 that "only another's love could prove my worth absolutely," since being
 "lovable" is synonymous with being beautiful (211), Grealy "blamed my face
 for everything," the "tangible element of what was wrong with my life and
 with me" (127). Time and again Grealy represents herself as a kind of inter
 loper in a world in which she feels displaced:
 I was myself only in the briefest of moments. (89)
 The only time I was ever completely myself was on Fridays. (90)
 I possessed a strong sense of myself. ... I had no sense of myself in relation to . . .
 'normal' people. (105)
 [TJhe barn became the one place where I felt like myself. (182)
 The hospital was the only place on earth where I didn't feel self-conscious. (187)
This content downloaded from 141.222.114.59 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 11:41:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 180 Biography 24.1 (Winter 2001)
 Recuperating from chemotherapy alone in a house typically crowded with
 siblings, Grealy becomes a "snoop . . . looking for clues to how other people
 lived their lives." "What was it like," she wonders, "to be somebody else?"
 (81)"
 These repeated descriptions of casting herself into other identities—her
 intimations that "being herself" is but a fleeting experience quickly over
 whelmed by a much stronger conviction that she "was too horrible to look
 at," that her "ugliness was equal to a great personal failure" (185)—represent
 "self" as a thing deferred, held in suspension as Grealy awaits the face that
 will finally feel "'real'" (157):
 Beauty, as defined by society at large, seemed to be only about who was best at
 looking like everyone else. . . . [E]ach time I was wheeled down to the surgical
 wing ... I'd think to myself, Now, now I can start my life, just as soon as I wake up
 from this operation. And no matter how disappointed I felt when I woke up and
 looked in the mirror, I'd simply postpone happiness until the next operation.
 (187)
 But the reiterated disappointment that accompanies Grealy's hopes of final
 ly achieving the physical ordinariness that paradoxically will make her "an
 individual" is countered by the way in which her experience of disease
 heightens her attunement to her own body, as well as to the ideological
 manipulation of the body in culture. Cancer, chemotherapy, surgery, and
 recovery make Grealy "ever more intimate" with her body (57)—with its
 "rhythms," its internal organs, its capacity for pain and for healing. "I was
 becoming aware that I was experiencing my body, and the world, different
 ly from other people," she writes, "aware that normally I'd have no reason to
 'feel' my body or know it so intimately" (90-91).7 That slight parentheti
 cal—"and the world"—points to the text's larger philosophical argument.
 Not just a body in pain, Grealy is precisely a body in the world, and it is that
 perspective—"trapped in my own body," as she puts it—that escorts her to
 "occasionally even telling myself I was lucky, lucky to have this opportunity
 to know such things" (91). "Didn't my face open me up to perceptions I
 might otherwise be blind to?" she asks, only in part ironically, since it is her
 certitude that she is ugly that leads her eventually to revise her conception of
 "real beauty," to coordinate the face in the mirror with "the person I thought
 I was, or wanted to be" (150, 175).
 By bearing witness to her own implication in myths of feminine beauty
 and bodily inadequacy, Grealy's story becomes a politically useful revision, a
 blueprint for conceiving of new ways of being. "The journey back to my face
 was a long one," Grealy writes (220). She describes years spent "detaching"
 herself from any desire other than to manufacture the face that will certify her
 worthiness (179). Neither androgynous anonymity nor a spate of "highly
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 charged sexual relationship [s]" with men serves adequately to "define" her or
 to compensate for the "obstacle of my face" (207, 206). Only by avoiding
 any reflection of her own image—not simply in mirrors but even coffee urns,
 door handles, tabletops—does Grealy begin to separate a sense of self from
 her consuming preoccupation with physical beauty, and to name "the per
 son in the mirror" as herself (220, 221). This process of recognition entails
 reconceptualizing her face, retrieving it from its isolated position as "a single
 stigmatic trait" (Thomson, Extraordinary 11) so that it no longer symbolizes
 some generalized inferiority, a deficiency of will or character, a failure to con
 trol the body—in short, what A. G. Gowman once termed a whole "gestalt
 of disability" (qtd. in Goffman 205). If not looking at her reflection makes
 Grealy a temporary exile from her corporeal self, it also allows her to relin
 quish what she describes as "the framework of when my face gets fixed, then
 I'll start living" (221), and thus to attend to other features of her subjectivi
 ty. Finally unable to depend on yet another operation to solve her feelings of
 inadequacy, she must incorporate her face, in a kind of literal way, as a mem
 ber of her body, to experience embodiment as inextricable from her self. "A
 part of me . . . that had always been there," she writes, begins at last "to
 speak" (221).
 In a well-known moment from her essay "Professions for Women," Vir
 ginia Woolf names one of "the adventures of. . . professional life" as "telling
 the truth about my own experiences as a body" (288). Her confessed inabil
 ity to "solve" this problem, to make the female body visible by authoring
 rather than by objectifying it, to grant a woman's corporeal experience a kind
 of truth-status, becomes Woolf s legacy to later autobiographers. Narrating
 her past in the specific terms of living with illness, Grealy wrests what Leigh
 Gilmore calls "the agency of re-membering" from hegemonic discourse, and
 textualizes her body back together (239). But the effect—and, I think, the
 very purpose—of her "manifesto" (Smith, Subjectivity 157) is not to guar
 antee a unified female body, but rather to keep the "story" of the female
 body in motion, to show how the "truth" of particular bodies is open to revi
 sion. "Telling the truth" thus becomes a necessarily revolutionary act, a ques
 tion not of establishing an essential femaleness, but rather of "reconstruct [ing]
 the world," as Gilmore argues, "from a subject position not based on exclu
 sion, violent differentiation, or the compulsory masking of identities" (239).
 Grealy's face is an inescapable component of her identity, but its meaning is
 neither inevitable nor imprisoning. While Autobiography of a Face assures us
 that Grealy's face participates in the establishment of "who" she is, the text
 does not also try to pin down a definition of that person in any closed,
 enduring way. Neither a story of triumph over adversity and physical disas
 ter, nor one that presumes a stable reference point, a "here" from which the
 story is told, Autobiography of a Face is an autobiography without resolution.
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 Grealy sets physical disease against cultural dis-ease, suggesting that the
 material conditions of surviving cancer and bodily "deformity" help her to
 discover something about the "sickness" of living as a woman in patriarchal
 culture. In this sense both the body writing and the body described become
 thresholds: "neither—while also being both—the private or the public, self
 or other, natural or cultural" (Grosz 23), disrupting the kinds of binary cat
 egorizations that underwrite cultural oppression. Moreover, by refusing to
 deflect the gaze from her body—indeed, by training her own as well as her
 readers' gazes steadily on the problematic of "the body" through her own
 physical experience—Grealy breaks the habit of accommodating a marginal
 self to social pressures by alternately denying and exaggerating difference.8
 Yet in a surprising shift at the end of the book, Grealy stages a metaphorical
 looking away, insuring that the text, and the identity narrated therein,
 remain fluid and open-ended. After nearly a year of avoiding her image, Gre
 aly finds that she has "no idea" how her face appears to others, and she looks
 into a darkened window "to see if I could, now, recognize myself" (222,
 223). Lonely self-scrutiny and stark, clinical detail have characterized most
 of Grealy's prior descriptions of her face. Here, however, for the first time in
 the book, she does not provide a single detail of her current appearance.
 Unexpectedly preventing us from seeing her, Grealy intimates that the only
 gaze that matters is her own. At the same time, the implied turning away
 from the window transforms Grealy's "visage" from a specimen to be exam
 ined to simply one other face in the public, communal setting of the café
 (200). The "night-silvered glass" in which her reflection will be indistinct,
 and the male companion whose interest in her is at once affirming and irrel
 evant—these too suggest that even Grealy no longer sees herself as a solitary
 contemptible body part. Rather, the ambiguity of this closing scene presents
 identity as always in process, entailing simultaneous connection to and sep
 aration from others. Denying us access to her body at precisely the moment
 when it seems she might finally accept herself as "normal" or even "attrac
 tive," Grealy refuses to capitulate to a desire for definition and closure, and
 so culminates her text by rupturing the very identity she had seemed so
 actively to seek.
 It is this notion of breakage that Grealy brings to the fore to protest the
 cultural subject position of a disfigured woman, the paradox of being some
 how at once nobody and nothing but body. Far from suggesting that she
 ultimately transcends the weight and drag of corporeality, Grealy writes with
 her body a radical new form of discourse, a subversive text. Autobiography of
 a Face is a declaration of inimitable experience, as well as a window and a
 mirror in which we recognize our own bodies, our own contingent selves.
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 NOTES
 1. Sidonie Smith's Poetics of Women's Autobiography provides a concise history of the
 generic conventions of traditional autobiography. For excellent discussions that com
 bine the concerns of feminist and disability theory, see especially Rosemarie Garland
 Thomson's Extraordinary Bodies, and Smith's Subjectivity, Identity, and the Body, as well
 as the introduction by Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson to their edited collection Get
 ting a Life. The present essay is indebted to the pioneering work of Smith, Thomson,
 and G. Thomas Couser in the fields of women's autobiography and disability theory.
 2. The complaint that the political efficacy of disability autobiographies runs aground
 because they confine themselves too much to a private realm of inferiority and person
 al grief has been made by Lennard J. Davis in Enforcing Normalcy, and by David T.
 Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder in The Body and Physical Dijference.
 3. See Thomson, "Feminist Theory"; Wendell; and Asch and Fine. Couser has also made
 this point.
 4. Grealy herself initially makes this distinction, referring to her "body" as "something I
 had control over," and writing that, after hours spent working out at a gym, "even I
 had to admit I had a sexy body" (208, 207).
 5. To be "recognized" in the psychoanalytic sense is to be acknowledged as a separate
 individual, as what Jessica Benjamin calls a subject or an "author" of desire. Grealy
 records a progression from "detaching myself from my desires," to the "major step for
 ward" of starting to "own my desires" (179, 205).
 6. Nancy Mairs has made this claim of her own MS and of disability generally. In Waist
 High in the World, Mairs writes that "Disability is at once a metaphorical and a mate
 rial state, evocative of other conditions in time and space—childhood and imprison
 ment come to mind—yet 'like' nothing but itself. I can't live it or write about it except
 by conflating the figurative and the substantial, the 'as if with the relentlessly 'what is'"
 (58).
 7. In her essay "Medical Identity: My DNA/Myself," Kay K. Cook also describes "inva
 sive" medical tests as introducing her to "a material selfhood heretofore invisible":
 "These continuous reminders of the materiality and interiority of my body challenge
 the ways that I have been used to thinking about my 'self' as a fairly disembodied sub
 ject" (65).
 8. One goal of the disability autobiography is to counter what Thomson has noted about
 the extraordinary body in literature—"literary texts necessarily make disabled charac
 ters into freaks, stripped of normalizing contexts and engulfed by a single stigmatic
 trait" (Extraordinary 11)—by situating the body within the larger context of an indi
 vidual's life story. As Couser argues, "autobiography serves to deflect the gaze from a
 body that might otherwise trigger stereotypical responses" (182). By highlighting her
 experience as a disabled or disfigured body, however, Grealy goes one step further, not
 just insisting on the "ordinariness" of putatively different bodies, but also challenging
 readers to reconsider the entrenched notions of the body as a thing to be ignored, tol
 erated, or overcome by a controlling mind.
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